Race and Assisted Reproduction:
Implications for Population Health by Ahmed, Aziza
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 86 Issue 6 Article 15 
2018 
Race and Assisted Reproduction: Implications for Population 
Health 
Aziza Ahmed 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Law and Race 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Aziza Ahmed, Race and Assisted Reproduction: Implications for Population Health, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 
2811 (2018). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol86/iss6/15 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 2801 
RACE AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR POPULATION HEALTH 
Aziza Ahmed* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article emerges from Fordham Law Review’s Symposium on the 
fiftieth anniversary of Loving v. Virginia,1 the case that found 
antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional.2  Inspired by the need to interrogate 
the regulation of race in the context of family, this Article examines the 
diffuse regulatory environment around assisted reproductive technology 
(ART) that shapes procreative decisions and the inequalities that these 
decisions may engender.3  ART both centers biology and raises questions 
about how we imagine our racial futures in the context of family, community, 
and nation.4  Importantly, ART demonstrates how both the state and private 
 
*  Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.  Many thanks to Kimani Paul-
Emile, Robin Lenhardt, and Tanya Hernández for inviting me to participate in the Fordham 
Law Review Symposium entitled Fifty Years of Loving v. Virginia and the Continued Pursuit 
of Racial Equality held at Fordham University School of Law on November 2–3, 2017.  My 
deep gratitude to Melissa Murray, Jason Jackson, and Libby Adler for their generous 
comments on an earlier draft of this Article and to Linda McClain and Ashley Shattles for 
several helpful discussions that helped shape this paper.  For an overview of the Symposium, 
see R.A. Lenhardt, Tanya K. Hernández & Kimani Paul-Emile, Foreword:  Fifty Years of 
Loving v. Virginia and the Continued Pursuit of Racial Equality, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2625 
(2018). 
 
 1. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 2. Id. at 11–12. 
 3. Another site of racial regulation in the context of family formation that is not discussed 
in this Article is adoption.  For a discussion of the states’ regulation of adoption, see generally 
R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire:  Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial Preferences 
Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998).  In her Article published in 
this issue, Melissa Murray poignantly highlights how interracial families continue to be 
punished in the context of child custody as well. See generally Melissa Murray, Loving’s 
Legacy:  Decriminalization and the Regulation of Sex and Sexuality, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2671 (2018).  
 4. Managing race and reproduction has long been in the purview of the state.  State 
rationales for doing so are diverse—from economic and public health concerns to preserving 
a sense of nationhood and belonging:  What kind of country should we be?  What kind of 
citizens should this nation have?  Ideas of race and nation are also central to determining who 
will and will not benefit from the privileges of citizenship.  Now-discredited racial science 
justified the idea that a claim to citizenship should be dependent on race.  It relied on the 
rationale that some races were superior to others and therefore deserving of greater rights with 
respect to the states.  In turn, this logic justified state persecution and prosecution of interracial 
marriage and procreation.  For example, the 1955 Supreme Court of Virginia case Naim v. 
Naim found an interracial marriage void because protecting “the racial integrity” of its citizens 
and preventing a “mongrel” breed of citizens was seen to be within the state’s purview. 87 
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actors shape family formation along racial lines.5  By placing a discussion 
about race and ART in the context of access to new health technologies, this 
Article argues that assisted reproduction has population-level effects that 
mirror broader racial disparities in health.  In turn, this Article intervenes in 
a bioethics debate that frequently ignores inequalities in access when thinking 
through the consequences of ART. 
Part I presents a case study of the Sperm Bank of California (SBC) to 
demonstrate how ART represents a new mode of governing the family that 
facilitates and encourages the formation and creation of monoracial families.6  
Part II borrows a public health analytic, the “burdens of disease,”7 to explain 
how the (re)production of monoracial families has consequences for health 
at the population level, especially when placed in the context of racially 
disparate access to ART services.  Ultimately, this Article concludes that 
ART, as it is currently accessed and utilized, maintains racial orders with 
regard to health given the inequality in access to these services.8 
I.  THE CASE OF SBC 
First utilized in the 1970s, ART is a relatively new means of producing 
families.  The technologies associated with ART allow individuals to 
reproduce with their own genetic material or to select the sperm, eggs, or 
embryos of others.  The pressure to reproduce one’s racial self is high and, 
perhaps more problematically, encouraged.9 
Although it is not possible to generalize from one case, an examination of 
SBC, a progressive sperm bank with feminist roots,10 demonstrates the 
 
S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va.), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955); id. at 751 (“Marriage, as creating the 
most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a 
people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature.” 
(quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888))).  But see Loving, 388 U.S. at 7–8 (finding 
that the state’s ability to regulate marriage is bound by the Fourteenth Amendment).  For an 
overview, see generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION:  HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND 
BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011). 
 5. See infra Parts I–II. 
 6. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, A House Divided:  
The Invisibility of the Multiracial Family, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 231 (2009) (arguing 
that, despite Loving, the normative family ideal is both monoracial and heterosexual). 
 7. See Global Burden of Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/topics/global_burden_of_disease/en/ [https://perma.cc/J3UW-AZHV] 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 8. There is a large amount of literature on racial disparities with regard to health in both 
law and public health. See, e.g., KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE:  AN ETHNOGRAPHY 
OF PREGNANCY AS A SITE OF RACIALIZATION (2011); DAYNA BOWEN MATTHEW, JUST 
MEDICINE:  A CURE FOR RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (2015); Nancy 
Krieger, Embodying Inequality:  A Review of Concepts, Measures, and Methods for Studying 
Health Consequences of Discrimination, 29 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVICES 295 (1999).  Race also 
plays a role in doctor-patient relationships.  See generally Kimani Paul-Emile et al., Dealing 
with Racist Patients, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 708 (2016). 
 9. For a detailed account of how providers pressure individuals to choose same-race 
gametes, see generally Robin Lenhardt, The Color of Kinship, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2071 (2017). 
 10. SBC was formerly a project of the Oakland Feminist Women’s Health Center. History, 
SPERM BANK CAL., https://www.thespermbankofca.org/content/history [https://perma.cc/ 
ZA92-RY3R] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
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explicit way in which reproducing oneself racially with the goal of a 
monoracial family is promoted by reproductive-health service providers.  
SBC’s website claims that the organization is a “trusted friend by your side 
on your parenthood journey” that has an “unwavering commitment to the 
well-being of parents, children, and donors.”11  In turn, SBC offers advice 
and guidance on the selection of sperm—making “ethnicity” central to 
choosing the sperm.12  The word “ethnicity” on the website appears to be a 
stand-in for the word race.  The website begins with a reminder that SBC’s 
goal is to “help contribute to your future child’s and family’s long-term well-
being” and, in turn, “present[s] reasons to consider selecting a donor who 
looks like you, your partner, and the people who will surround your child as 
they grow up.”13  This statement seems intended to soften a strong line taken 
by SBC that individuals race match. 
SBC provides a range of justifications for why it is important to choose a 
sperm donor of a similar ethnic background.14  These include that children 
“want to belong” and that having the same physical characteristics as their 
parents will contribute to a child’s sense of acceptance.15  Alternatively, 
parents, the website argues, will not be able to adequately prepare children 
for the racial discrimination they may face.16  The message is clear:  select 
gametes of the same race as you or your family will face ongoing 
challenges.17  Interestingly, SBC argues this is important to consider even 
where there is a known donor.18  In other words, even when individuals may 
have a friend or family member of a different ethnicity that they would utilize 
as a sperm donor, SBC’s website encourages individuals to acquire sperm of 
the same ethnicity as the future parents because of the negative ramifications 
of having a mixed-race family.19 
Legal discourse also contributes to the informal regulation of racial 
selection.  The site features a link to a story published in an Our Family 
Coalition newsletter; the story is an autobiographical account of a lesbian 
couple considering various sperm samples for insemination.20  Ilana Sherer, 
who authors the account, takes readers through the couple’s thought process 
in selecting a sperm donor.21  Initially, the couple sought sperm that would 
 
 11. Why Choose TSBC, SPERM BANK CAL., https://www.thespermbankofca.org/why-
choose-tsbc [https://perma.cc/5AQL-SPQ2] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).  
 12. Donor Ethnicity, Your Family and Your Future Child, SPERM BANK CAL., 
https://www.thespermbankofca.org/tsbcfile/choosing-ethnicity-my-donor [https://perma.cc/ 
FJ4A-FK8Q] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.  These arguments mirror broader concerns raised in the context of adoption. See 
generally Banks, supra note 3; Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong?:  The 
Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991). 
 17. See Donor Ethnicity, Your Family and Your Future Child, supra note 12. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Ilana Sherer, Known and Unknowns, OUR FAM. COALITION (Our Family Coal., S.F., 
Cal.), Winter 2015, at 1, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1klt_1MTF7malozaVJtbk 
NTMFU/view [https://perma.cc/5GJB-XXFY]. 
 21. Id. 
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account for the appearance of Sherer, the noncarrying partner.22  Sherer 
describes herself as an “Eastern European Jew[]” with “kinky curly dark hair 
and olive skin”23 and notes that the couple considered Arab, Latino, and 
Native American sperm.24  In describing their struggle to choose the right 
sperm, Sherer references25 the infamous case of Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm 
Bank, LLC.26 
Cramblett is controversial case given the national dialogue it generated 
about race and assisted reproduction.27  The case involves Jennifer Cramblett 
and her partner.28  The couple, both white, chose the sperm coded as white 
for insemination.29  Instead of the chosen sperm, Cramblett was mistakenly 
given sperm from an African American donor due to an error in 
handwriting.30  In her complaint to the court, Cramblett describes her reaction 
to learning she had been impregnated with African American sperm.31  She 
was “crying, confused and upset,” and felt “anger, disappointment and 
fear.”32  After speaking to the sperm bank (which she described as being 
abrupt with her), she cried uncontrollably and began to shake, and “her hands 
and feet became numb.”33  Since the birth of the child, she argued that they 
have had great difficulty:  they have racist family members, their daughter’s 
hair requires trips to a faraway hair salon in a Black neighborhood that does 
not entirely accept her, and Jennifer did not know any African Americans 
until college.34  To be sure, it is likely upsetting to be pregnant with sperm 
you did not select.  But what makes this so problematic is that it is quite clear 
that their reaction was based not only on the incorrect sperm but that it was 
African American sperm. 
Meaningfully, the Sherer family’s logic for choosing a white child draws 
in part on the wrongful-birth case of the Crambletts.  As Sherer explains: 
[W]hen I first heard the story of the white Ohio couple who mistakenly 
conceived with sperm from an African-American donor[,] I was of course 
shocked and embarrassed to hear that the parents of a healthy lovely bi-
racial child would sue for wrongful birth, but I also understood and 
respected the challenges they articulated and the unpreparedness they felt 
in raising their bi-racial child.  In my perspective, they should be able to 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 13. 
 25. Id. 
 26. 230 F. Supp. 3d 865 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
 27. See, e.g., Lenhardt, supra note 9; Patricia J. Williams, Babies, Bodies and Buyers, 33 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 11 (2016). 
 28. Cramblett, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 867–68. 
 29. Id. at 867. 
 30. Id.  For more scholarship on Cramblett, see Lenhardt, supra note 9, at 2088 (urging 
that increased attention be paid to both how race shapes families’ functions and how structural 
inequality shapes notions of race in the family); Williams, supra note 27, at 11 (discussing the 
advent of new genetic technologies and arguing that the “ultra-contractarianism of our 
neoliberal moment” compromises the goals of public accommodation). 
 31. Complaint at 4–7, Cramblett, 230 F. Supp. 3d 865 (No. 16-C-4553). 
 32. Id. at 4–5. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 6–7. 
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sue for breach of contract as they did not receive the sperm they had 
selected, but the manner they articulated the issue as a wrongful birth suit 
was absolutely heartbreaking.  At the same time, I am glad that they did 
name the same struggles that many of us (white prospective parents) go 
through when choosing a sperm donor.  So often we see public figures and 
celebrities adopting multi-racial children without comment, yet presenting 
their family as “race blind” is ignoring the reality of institutionalized 
racism.  We felt that as a white couple, using a donor of color would feel 
like we were intentionally trying to exotify our family and using white 
privilege to appropriate and potentially whiten another’s cultural 
heritage.35 
In making these arguments, they go further than the Crambletts.  Sherer 
gives the sperm not only a race but suggests the sperm has a culture.  In doing 
so, she likens adopting a child of color with gestating a mixed-race child.36  
The couple ultimately concluded that it was better to get a child whose 
“ethnic background matched” their own.37  The struggle of the Sherer family 
demonstrates how the attention generated by litigation helps to shape the 
social context in which individuals choose gametes. 
The operationalization of assisted reproductive technologies is shaped by 
the way we imagine our communities and futures—one in which racial 
homogeneity is a ticket to being part of a self-preserving family.  SBC’s 
website makes this clear:  “Resemblance is one signal of kinship.  For the 
child, physical resemblance helps create bonds and has the capacity to create 
a feeling of connectedness.  Without resemblance, there can be an experience 
of unfamiliarity, unpredictability, of being the ‘other.’”38 
The case of the SBC provides a view into how law and ART services—in 
this case, sperm banks—constitute what it means to have not only a 
biological connection but also a sense of kinship that is rooted in ideas about 
race.39  These informal modes of regulation provide the context in which 
individuals shape racialized decision-making about reproduction.40 
II.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF ACCESS 
In her article, The Color of Kinship, Professor Robin Lenhardt begins to 
theorize the ways in which the pressure to form racially homogenous families 
has structural implications: 
We have not yet begun to grapple in earnest with the role of family and 
family law in racial formation in the United States.  This can only change, 
however, if scholars begin to internalize the importance of race “as an 
organizing principle of social relationships” in society that affects not just 
 
 35. Sherer, supra note 20, at 13.  
 36. See id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Donor Ethnicity, Your Family and Your Future Child, supra note 12. 
 39. See Lenhardt, supra note 9, at 2075 (“[K]inships, whether old or new, have been 
framed as essentially race-neutral relationships and affective ties that implicate matters of 
gender, sexuality, and even class, but exist before or somehow outside of race. . . .  [N]othing 
could be farther from the truth.  Kinship has a color.”). 
 40. See id. at 2078–79. 
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minorities, but all members of society . . . .  On this account, race stands 
not as a biological trait, but a social construction that functions as a multi-
valent mechanism for racial signification and hierarchy that both draws on 
and reconstitutes “the racial legacies” of the past—e.g., slavery and Jim 
Crow segregation.  And it does this through a constantly shifting web of 
practices and systems that structure society and, to that extent, directly 
inform the functioning of social units, to include families.  Familial norms 
and laws, especially those bearing on marriage, parenting, and familial 
roles, help to determine both how race is defined and experienced as well 
as the social location that a familial unit will occupy at a given point in 
time.  Understanding this fully means greater attentiveness to the role of 
family systems and structures in producing race and structure of 
opportunity for kin groups.41 
Following Lenhardt’s call to interrogate race and family formation, this 
Part explores the implications of unequal access to the new reproductive 
technologies.  Specifically, it explores how, when placed within the context 
of the racial disparities associated with access to ART, the drive to produce 
monoracial families reproduces disparate population-level health effects 
along racial lines.  This Part begins by describing how access and utilization 
of ART is divided along racial lines.  The racial disparity in utilizing ART 
services results in an uneven utilization of new technologies, including 
genetic testing, to limit the possibility of poor health outcomes.42  Drawing 
on the public health analytic “burdens of disease,” this Part argues that 
disparate access to new reproductive technologies, alongside the push to 
create monoracial families, will result in disproportionate morbidity and 
mortality for racial minorities. 
A.  Access to ART 
Access to ART is deeply divided on race and class lines given the expense 
of accessing ART services.43  This inequality of access is furthered by the 
high cost of, and lack of insurance coverage for, these services.44  As of 2014, 
only fifteen states have laws that require some insurance coverage for 
assisted reproductive technology.45  Of those, many of the laws do not cover 
in vitro fertilization (IVF)—the most expensive fertility treatment—or more 
 
 41. Id. at 2100 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking 
Racism:  Toward a Structural Interpretation, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 465, 466 (1997)). 
 42. While it is possible to have genetic selection in a nonassisted pregnancy, this Article 
focuses on the testing and consequences derived from a bioethical debate on use of ART 
services, such as intracytoplasmic sperm injection and in vitro fertilization.   
 43. See generally Alicia Armstrong & Torie C. Plowden, Ethnicity and Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies, 9 CLINICAL PRAC. 651 (2012); Karni Kissil & Maureen Davey, 
Health Disparities in Procreation:  Unequal Access to Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 
24 J. FEMINIST FAM. THERAPY 197 (2012); Molly Quinn & Victor Fujimoto, Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Assisted Reproductive Technology Access and Outcomes, 105 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 1119 (2016). 
 44. State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (June 1, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-coverage-for-
infertility-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/K684-DMK4].   
 45. Id. 
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than one round of IVF, or they instead establish specific criteria that a patient 
must satisfy in order to qualify for the coverage.46  The average IVF cycle 
costs approximately $12,500 and requires a flexible work schedule to attend 
the numerous appointments.47  As a result, vast segments of the population 
are unable to access new reproductive technologies.48 
This, of course, has distributional consequences.  It is clear that, like most 
health services, there are extreme inequalities with regard to who is able to 
access ART.49  These inequalities play out in predictably race- and class-
based ways.50  Plainly speaking, African Americans, immigrants, and others 
with little insurance coverage cannot access ART services unless they are 
able to pay high out-of-pocket fees.51  Alongside the inability to pay, there 
are unidentified barriers for racial minorities in accessing ART.  
Epidemiological data suggest that the people who access reproductive 
technology are largely white.52  This holds even in states that mandate 
coverage for fertility services53 and despite the fact that the highest rates of 
infertility are found among African American women.54  Thus, it is necessary 
to explore how assisted reproduction becomes an axis upon which health 
outcomes are distributed. 
If an individual or couple engages in assisted reproduction, they may also, 
although not always, engage in preimplantation genetic screening (PGS) or 
diagnosis (PGD), alongside a host of other genetic screenings over the course 
of a pregnancy.55  IVF and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) both 
involve the production of embryos outside of the uterus, which provides an 
opportunity for genetic testing before implantation.56  Gamete and embryo 
testing, coupled with gamete and embryo selection, makes it possible to 
eliminate genetic conditions prior to their implantation.57  These new 
technologies allow parents to eliminate embryos that have particular 
conditions, including Tay-Sachs disease and trisomy 21 (Down syndrome).58  
This has resulted in a vigorous and rich bioethics debate on what it means to 
 
 46. Id.  Specific communities, including the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) communities, face unique barriers to accessing ART services. Kissil & Davey, supra 
note 43, at 199–203 (outlining how different segments of the population are presented with 
barriers to ART services based on cost and socioeconomic status, race and ethnicity, marital 
status and sexual orientation, age, and illnesses). 
 47. Armstrong & Plowden, supra note 43, at 652. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.; Kissil & Davey, supra note 43, at 199. 
 50. Armstrong & Plowden, supra note 43, at 652–653; Kissil & Davey, supra note 43, at 
199–201. 
 51. Armstrong & Plowden, supra note 43, at 652. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 657. 
 55. Practice Comm. of the Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. Tech. & Practice Comm. of the 
Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Preimplantation Genetic Testing:  A Practice Committee 
Opinion, 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY S136, S136 (2008). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Genetic Selection, CTR. FOR GENETICS & SOC’Y, https://www.geneticsandsociety.org/ 
topics/genetic-selection [https://perma.cc/XQ2E-4QXN] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
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choose embryos—a debate that includes responses from the disability-rights 
community.59  These discussions, however, often do not consider the new 
structural inequalities produced by existing inequalities in access to new 
reproductive health technologies.  Instead, the debates are frequently 
centered on the theoretical possibilities of eliminating particular disabilities 
as a form of eugenics, the possibilities of “designer babies,” and the scientific 
possibilities associated with genetic testing.60  A broader discussion of how 
class or inequality will shape the experience of assisted reproduction is 
missing. 
B.  Burden of Disease:  Applying a Public Health Frame to ART 
We can see how inequality structures population-level health effects vis-
à-vis assisted reproduction using the example of breast cancer.  A relatively 
recent innovation in reproductive technologies is the ability to use PGD 
testing to reduce the chance of having biological offspring with BRCA-1 and 
BRCA-2, the genetic mutations associated with higher rates of breast 
 
 59. The disability-rights arguments are varied.  A report published by the Hastings Center 
summarized several of these critiques:  that abortion based on genetic testing expresses a 
discriminatory attitude toward the disabled; that parents have a false impression that they can 
create perfection; that prenatal testing and genetic counseling are based on misinformation 
founded on a lack of experience with disabled children; and that genetic testing occurs in a 
world in which ideas of normalcy are loaded with judgment yet treated as natural. See 
generally Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch, The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic 
Testing:  Reflections & Recommendations, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.–Oct. 1999, at S1.  The 
authors of the report further outline three primary arguments made by the disability-rights 
community that place a greater emphasis on the expectations of parents:   
1)  Continuing, persistent, and pervasive discrimination constitutes the major 
problem of having a disability for people themselves and for their families and 
communities.  Rather than improving the medical or social situation of today’s or 
tomorrow’s disabled citizens, prenatal diagnosis reinforces the medical model that 
disability itself, not societal discrimination against people with disabilities, is the 
problem to be solved.  
2)  In rejecting an otherwise desired child because they believe that the child’s 
disability will diminish their parental experience, parents suggest that they are 
unwilling to accept any significant departure from the parental dreams that a child’s 
characteristics might occasion.  
3)  When prospective parents select against a fetus because of predicted disability, 
they are making an unfortunate, often misinformed decision that a disabled child 
will not fulfill what most people seek in child rearing, namely, “to give ourselves to 
a new being who starts out with the best we can give, and who will enrich us, gladden 
others, contribute to the world, and make us proud.”  
Id. at S2 (quoting Adrienne Asch, Reproductive Technology and Disability, in REPRODUCTIVE 
LAWS FOR THE 1990S, at 69, 86 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989)). 
 60. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION (2007).  Sandel 
traces some of these debates in his book and presents arguments for and against “perfection.”  
Those who support human enhancement have revived the language of eugenics by calling for 
“liberal eugenics.” Id. at 75–76.  Sandel describes that what differentiates the old eugenics 
from a newer, liberal eugenics, as argued by bioethicists who defend the idea, is that the 
benefits and burdens of a liberal eugenics would be fairly distributed rather than burdening 
only the weak and the poor. Id. at 76. 
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cancer.61  PGD testing allows embryos to be tested for the genetic mutations 
and then eliminated if they are found to carry the mutation.62  PGD testing 
requires that a couple utilize IVF to first extract gametes and then produce an 
embryo in a lab that can be tested.63 
This technology, despite its revolutionary capacity to eliminate forms of 
cancer, is nowhere near universally available.64  In fact, in the United States, 
this service would likely require an out-of-pocket payment of approximately 
$20,000 per cycle (if a person pays for PGD as well as IVF).65  As described, 
insurance frequently does not cover these services.66  Thus, it is only a select 
segment of society with access to the necessary resources, or insurance 
coverage, who would theoretically be able to reduce the possibility of breast 
cancer in their families.  And, in a world in which the few individuals with 
access to ART are concerned about reproducing themselves, there is the 
added effect of concentrating the benefits of genetic testing among certain 
populations. 
Utilizing the “burden of disease” analytic borrowed from public health 
helps to think through the political and economic dimensions of gamete 
selection.  Burden of disease refers to quantification of the morbidity and 
mortality of a particular population based on the consequences of ill health.67  
What is clear from an examination of data collected under the burdens-of-
disease rubric is that ill health is both the product and cause of economic and 
racial disparity.68  This is particularly stark with regard to illnesses that have 
been virtually eliminated from developed countries but continue to exist in 
the developing world.69  Diseases like polio and tuberculosis, for example, 
were largely eradicated from the developed world long ago due to the advent 
of new technologies.70  The lack of access to these technologies results in the 
prevalence of such illnesses, sometimes on a mass scale, in poor communities 
and many developing countries.71  This is true even within the United 
 
 61. Joyce C. Harper et al., Views of BRCA Gene Mutation Carriers on Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis as a Reproductive Option for Hereditary Breast and Ovarian Cancer, 22 
HUM. REPROD. 1573, 1573 (2007). 
 62. Kenneth Offit et al., Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Cancer Syndromes:  A 
New Challenge for Preventive Medicine, 296 JAMA 2727, 2727 (2006).  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. (noting that access to PGD testing is currently very limited). 
 65. See Colleen Joy McCullough, Young Feminist:  Genetic Segregation:  The Next 
Frontier of American Inequality?, NAT’L WOMEN’S HEALTH NETWORK, 
https://www.nwhn.org/young-feminist-genetic-segregation-the-next-frontier-of-american-
inequality/ [https://perma.cc/7XZR-VLZK] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (arguing that women 
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States.72  Data suggest that the burden of disease for illnesses including 
cancers, cardiovascular conditions, diabetes, and others had the greatest 
impact on racial minorities.73  In fact, for racial minorities, the burden of 
disease frequently appears more similar to that in developing countries.74 
As new technologies develop, lack of access to these technologies may 
further inequalities of illness and worsen the burden of disease for particular 
communities.  As preventive medicine continues to develop with a focus on 
genetics, reproductive technology is implicated in the assessments of burdens 
of disease, as ART becomes a gateway for accessing genetic testing and, in 
turn, eliminating embryos that carry genetic mutations.  ART access is 
racialized, however.75  And, when in a clinic, the small set of people that 
utilize these services are encouraged to select racially homogenous gametes, 
the reproduction of race and health begin to look more like broader structural 
inequalities along the lines of race. 
Existing inequalities with regard to accessing technologies may help to 
predict the population-level outcomes of disparate access to the genetic-
testing technologies associated with ART.  In the United States, it is racial 
minorities, particularly Black, Latino, and immigrant communities, that bear 
the adverse consequences of ill health due to poverty, lack of insurance, and, 
in turn, lack of access to health services and technologies.76  Bracketing the 
much larger and important conversation on disability rights, it is clear that 
the aggregate impact of access to genetic testing and gamete selection to 
remove particular traits would result in a maldistribution of health-related 
challenges. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article explores how state and private actors shape decision-making 
on race in the context of family formation and reproduction and its impact on 
public health.  The selection of gametes and genetic material for the purpose 
of reproduction raises core questions about the centrality of race in 
discussions on family and kinship.  Service providers aid in the regulation of 
racial selection of families, typically by recommending that families race 
match in the gamete-selection process.  Race matching, in the context of 
racial inequality in access to ART services, will have aggregate population-
level effects along racial lines reflecting larger structural inequalities.  These 
structural considerations have largely been ignored in the broader bioethical 
debate on assisted reproduction and genetics. 
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